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Abstract 33 
We examine international public opinion towards stem-cell research during the period when the 34 
issue was at its most contentious. We draw upon representative sample surveys in Europe and 35 
North America, fielded in 2005 and find that the majority of people in Europe, Canada and the 36 
United States supported stem-cell research, providing it was tightly regulated, but that there were 37 
key differences between the geographical regions in the relative importance of different types of 38 
ethical position. In the U.S., moral acceptability was more influential as a driver of support for 39 
stem-cell research; in Europe the perceived benefit to society carried more weight; and in Canada 40 
the two were almost equally important. We also find that public opinion on stem-cell research 41 
was more strongly associated with religious convictions in the U.S. than in Canada and Europe, 42 
although many strongly religious citizens in all regions approved of stem-cell research.  We 43 
conclude that if anything public opinion or ‘public ethics’ are likely to play an increasingly 44 
important role in framing policy and regulatory regimes for sensitive technologies in the future. 45 
 46 
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Introduction 55 
A number of development trajectories in the domain of modern biotechnology – most notably the 56 
fate of GM food in Europe – have demonstrated the centrality of public concerns in sustainable 57 
technology development. The reception of new technologies by the public is linked to judgements 58 
about risks and benefits, but it is also based on ethical issues and general ideas about ‘how we 59 
want to live,’ and this is particularly the case for sensitive technologies in the life sciences. Given 60 
the ongoing explosion of new gene-based technologies such as synthetic biology, cloning, gene 61 
editing and personalized medicine, we seek in this paper to add historical context to such debates 62 
by examining an exemplar case – that of human embryonic stem-cell research.  63 
 64 
The history of political and public debates about novel interventions in the process of reproduction 65 
appears to repeat itself. Recent controversies over the future of stem-cell research (1, 2)  echo 66 
elements of earlier debates on contraception and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), but they also 67 
prefigure more recent ones on synthetic biology and gene editing (3, 4). At the centre of these 68 
debates is the question: ‘what are the limits to human intervention in matters of life?’ Offering 69 
the opportunity of sex without reproduction, contraception was considered by some to be an 70 
aberration and a threat to the moral order. Much the same was said of IVF, which brought the 71 
possibility of reproduction without sex. Yet with some exceptions both contraception and IVF are 72 
now broadly accepted and in widespread use. 73 
 74 
Two decades have passed since ‘Dolly’ the cloned sheep swept the world’s headlines, generating 75 
moral outrage over the boundaries of acceptable interference in creation (5). Research has 76 
continued and the debate has become more nuanced, most notably after the isolation of embryonic 77 
stem-cells; and we saw the distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning being 78 
developed in public discourse (6). As research evolved into the new millennium, stem-cell 79 
research became one of the most contested issues in science policy making. While stem-cell 80 
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research is heralded as a major breakthrough in biomedical science, as Nielsen notes, it was 81 
‘attained with cloning having the dubious status of the most promising as well as the most 82 
controversial among the many emerging biotechnologies’ (7). The National Research Council in 83 
the U.S. wrote that stem-cell research has led ‘scientists and non-scientists alike to contemplate 84 
profound issues, such as who we are and what makes us human beings.’ (8). 85 
Public ethics 86 
Alongside elite discourse and debate, amongst scientists, legislators, regulators and ethicists, the 87 
opinions of lay publics have been, and continue to be, important. We use the term ‘public ethics’ 88 
not because we assume that public opinions are necessarily evidence of intensive deliberation or 89 
elaboration by the public such as that practiced by professional ethicists. Rather it is because we 90 
regard it as plausible to map some important attitudinal dimensions onto established ethical 91 
principles or moral positions. The reason for this comes from recent thinking in empirical moral 92 
psychology. In this field, recognized ethical and moral positions are regarded as formalisations of 93 
existing more fundamental attitudes and intuitions, rather than the latter being led by the former 94 
(9).  This being the case, such public ethics or opinions can act to constrain or enable scientific 95 
and technological development in democratic societies (10). Where such developments tap into 96 
especially ‘hot button’ issues or themes, public attitudes can, and do, come to the attention of 97 
politicians and regulators and sometimes have palpable effects on policy regimes and funding 98 
priorities. For example, the unofficial EU moratorium on commercial planting of genetically 99 
modified (GM) crops was one of the higher profile instances of politics and science colliding in 100 
the form of a World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute. European public opinion was – and 101 
remains – negative and very few GM crops are farmed in Europe despite a scientific consensus 102 
for their safety. Underlining this, one of the key biotech firms, BASF, moved its research 103 
operations to the U.S. in 2012, citing consumer resistance (11, 12).  That the controversy over 104 
GM crops led to a trade dispute between the U.S. and the EU underscores the importance of a 105 
comparative approach to understanding the foundations for public opinion about contentious 106 
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science and technology. To cite another contemporary example, within the US, public beliefs 107 
about anthropocentric global warming split along partisan lines (13) and the policy positions of 108 
Democrats and Republicans have to be understood in the context of the opinions of their 109 
supporters.   Different cultural sensitivities mean therefore that it cannot be assumed that public 110 
opinion towards new scientific and technological developments will align in the same way in 111 
different parts of the world or in different socio-political contexts.   112 
 113 
The first step for the current paper is to investigate and map out cross-national differences in 114 
public opinion on stem-cell research. The second is to examine what may underlie such 115 
differences as are observed, such that once such common factors are accounted for these cross-116 
national differences are attenuated or eliminated. Drawing on data from three comparative social 117 
surveys, which together captured public opinion in Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada at a 118 
time when the stem-cell debate was at its height (in the mid-2000s), we investigate factors 119 
underlying divergences in public perceptions. Of particular interest in the current research is the 120 
extent to which particular attitudes underlying approval of stem-cell research assume varying 121 
importance in different parts of the world. 122 
 123 
Stem-cell research and ethical dilemmas for policy makers 124 
The controversies surrounding human embryonic stem-cell research bring into focus two ideal-125 
type ethical positions or world-views, which we could refer to as a ‘sanctity of life’ ethic and a 126 
‘quality of life’ ethic. The ‘sanctity of life’ ethic outlines a deontological position that sees the 127 
embryo as a human being that, as such, possesses rights that are inviolable. Given that stem-cell 128 
research involves the destruction of embryos, it would be unethical to pursue it (14). By contrast, 129 
a ‘quality of life’ ethic argues for a utilitarian approach: a paramount duty to alleviate suffering, 130 
and given that this research may lead to cures for some serious diseases, it would be unethical not 131 
to pursue it. 132 
 6 
 
 133 
A starting premise of our study is that, when considering the viability of stem-cell research, 134 
researchers, politicians, regulators and the public at large are confronted by a classic dilemma: 135 
namely, how to come to terms with these two competing perspectives. Across Europe, the United 136 
States and Canada, politicians and regulators have adopted different resolutions to this dilemma. 137 
An adoption of a‘sanctity of life’ position was initially evident in the U.S., where the Bush 138 
administration limited federally funded stem-cell research to the use of a small number of existing 139 
cell lines. Congressional bills to allow the federal government to fund embryonic stem-cell 140 
research using supernumerary embryos from fertility clinics were vetoed by President Bush in 141 
2006 and 2007. The premise of this position was 142 
 143 
‘…not an attempt to answer the question of how the government might best advance embryonic 144 
stem-cell research while conforming to the law on the subject. Rather, it [was] an attempt to 145 
answer the question of how the government might avoid encouraging the (presumptively) 146 
unethical act of embryo destruction and still advance the worthy cause of medical research.’ (15) 147 
 148 
Some governments across the EU likewise issued similar cautious edicts based on concern for the 149 
sanctity of life vested in human embryos. In November 2005 an ethical declaration was signed by 150 
Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovakia that called for the exclusion 151 
of any kind of stem-cell research from European public funding under the seventh framework 152 
programme for research that ran from 2007 to 2013. 153 
 154 
In the U.S., the policy position adopted by the Bush administration was reversed in 2009 when 155 
an Executive Order was issued by President Barack Obama: 156 
 157 
‘For the past 8 years, the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services, including 158 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to fund and conduct human embryonic stem-cell research 159 
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has been limited by Presidential actions.  The purpose of this order is to remove these limitations 160 
on scientific inquiry, to expand NIH support for the exploration of human stem-cell research, and 161 
in so doing to enhance the contribution of America's scientists to important new discoveries and 162 
new therapies for the benefit of humankind.’ (16) 163 
 164 
This lifting of restrictions on federal funding of stem-cell research arguably now placed the U.S. 165 
alongside ‘quality of life’ proponents found in some EU member states. In Denmark, Greece, 166 
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain a liberal form of regulation allows for the procurement 167 
of stem-cell research from supernumerary embryos. Belgium, Sweden and the UK took a step 168 
further, legalising the creation of human embryos for the procurement of embryonic stem-cells, 169 
but only under strict conditions.  170 
 171 
Despite some national differences within Europe on the issue of stem-cell research, notably in 172 
Germany and Portugal (17), the European Union adopted a compromise position, albeit leaning 173 
towards a regime where research could take place. In June 2006 the EU Parliament approved the 174 
Commission’s proposal to support the use of public funds for stem-cell research. Subsequently, 175 
the European Council of Ministers agreed to allow the use of public funds for stem-cell research, 176 
and only  to prohibit the use of public funds for the procurement of new embryonic stem-cell 177 
lines. This echoes the policy climate in Canada, which legalised stem-cell research in 2004 on 178 
embryos that are surplus from fertility clinics, but retained a ban on therapeutic cloning and the 179 
creation of embryos for research. 180 
 181 
Across the three regions we can see, then, three distinct policy climates, ranging from a negative 182 
policy of restriction in the U.S. under the Bush administration, to a compromise position in 183 
Canada, to a position of broadly positive engagement in Europe. It has been argued that this kind 184 
of variation in regulatory regimes exists partly due to the strong influence of religion on politics 185 
in the U.S. in relation to Western Europe and to a lesser extent Canada (18). This view perhaps 186 
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overstates the causal influence of religion on political attitudes, but it is nevertheless true that 187 
conservative ideologies tend at least to be associated closely with religious culture in the U.S. and 188 
are often expressed more in 'moral' imperatives rather than the more liberal concerns of equality 189 
and collective utility (19). This religio-cultural climate is often contrasted with the more secular-190 
based style of government in Western Europe, particularly when considering the influence of 191 
prevailing religious norms on social and political attitudes (20). 192 
  193 
The present research 194 
Since embryonic stem-cell research came to public attention in the early 2000s, the broad trend 195 
for public perceptions has been for either stability or a relaxing of concerns. These trends have 196 
also led towards greater convergence in public opinion internationally, although the bases on 197 
which public perceptions are founded may be quite different. Understanding these bases is the 198 
focus of the present enquiry. According to the Virginia Commonwealth University Life Science 199 
Survey series (a nationally representative random-digit-dial survey), public support for stem-cell  200 
research in the U.S. rose from 40 percent in 2002 to around 65 percent in 2010 (21). Another 201 
survey, carried out in 2005 by Knowledge Networks on behalf of the Genetics & Public Policy 202 
Center, found that 67 percent of Americans approved of stem-cell research. Interestingly, while 203 
overall approval was high, the same survey found that all but 12 percent of respondents held at 204 
least some conflicting views about the need to preserve embryos versus the need to pursue 205 
research (22). That attitudes were far from unambiguous illustrates the need to look beyond simple 206 
approval ratings in order to understand public views on stem-cell research.  207 
 208 
 When it was last systematically measured with Eurobarometer surveys (23, 24), the percentage 209 
of Europeans approving of embryonic stem-cell research with either usual, or tighter regulations, 210 
was around 65 percent in both 2005 and in 2010.  In Canada, the most recent evidence comes 211 
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from an Angus Reid survey, which estimated the moral acceptability of stem-cell research was 212 
espoused by 65 percent of adult Canadians (25).  213 
 214 
While we have some evidence that attitudes between our three regions have converged in recent 215 
times, our interest in the current study is in understanding what the differing bases of these 216 
attitudes were at a time when debate was at its height and most salient in the minds of the public, 217 
in the mid-2000s. The variation between the U.S., Canada and Europe in styles of governance, 218 
regulatory regimes and cultural contexts provides a useful comparative framework to explore 219 
differences in attitudes towards stem-cell research. One of the hypotheses that we assess in what 220 
follows is that national differences in approval of stem-cell research may be explained by different 221 
levels of religiosity. Furthermore, we would expect to see religiosity as being associated with 222 
more negative attitudes towards stem-cell research. Moreover, we would expect to see this 223 
relationship having its strongest effect in the U.S., then Canada and finally Europe. 224 
 225 
Going beyond religiosity itself, the foregoing suggests that the ethical perspectives associated 226 
with religious versus secular based governance might also be reflected in the roots of public 227 
attitudes in these different regions. We would expect, therefore, that moral concerns were more 228 
influential for Americans and Canadians than for Western Europeans in coming to a judgment 229 
about stem-cell research. Concomitantly, we would also expect that considerations of benefits 230 
more than moral concerns have played a greater role for public attitudes in Western Europe than 231 
across the Atlantic. To summarise then, our research questions, which we seek to answer with 232 
data gathered during this critical period, are as follows: 233 
 234 
 What is the difference between the U.S., Canada and Western Europe in levels of public 235 
approval of stem-cell research? 236 
 237 
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 What is the influence of each of two types of perspectives on approval – moralconcerns 238 
and perceptions of benefits? 239 
 240 
 How do these influences vary in their importance across the U.S., Canada and Western 241 
Europe? 242 
 243 
To answer these questions, we test a series of regression models to demonstrate firstly the extent 244 
to which attitudes differ between the U.S., Canada and Western Europe, after accounting for 245 
differences in the demographic composition of the three regions. Secondly we assess the role of 246 
ethical considerations using two variables that broadly capture moral  and benefit-based (or 247 
utilitarian) concerns. Finally, we investigate the relative importance of these perspectives across 248 
the three regions.   249 
 250 
 251 
 252 
 253 
Data and methods 254 
The surveys 255 
Eurobarometer 64.3 on Biotechnology was the sixth in the series of surveys of public perceptions 256 
of biotechnology that began in 1991. The survey was fielded in 2005 in 25 member states of the 257 
European Union and afforded a unique opportunity to carry out comparative research between 258 
Europe and North America, with a set of harmonised questions being asked in each region. Multi-259 
stage random sampling procedures were used to provide a statistically representative sample of 260 
national residents aged 15 and over, with a total sample of circa 25,000 respondents interviewed 261 
face to face (26). The Canadian Biotechnology Strategy Secretariat's ‘International Public 262 
Opinion Research on Emerging Technologies’ survey was conducted during January and 263 
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February 2005 in Canada and in the U.S.. Random digit dialling was used to select representative 264 
probability samples of 2,000 respondents in Canada and 1,200 respondents in the U.S., all aged 265 
18 years or above, who were interviewed by telephone (27, 28). Both the the Canadian and 266 
European surveys had a split-ballot design where only a random half of the respondents were 267 
asked all of the questions included in the analyses presented here. 268 
 269 
The response variable: support for stem-cell research 270 
Canadian and U.S. respondents were given the following description: 271 
 272 
‘stem-cell research involves the use of special human cells to study diseases and their cures. stem-273 
cells have the unique ability to grow into any type of cell in the human body. stem-cell research 274 
has led to breakthroughs in our understanding of diabetes, MS, and Parkinson’s disease that offer 275 
the potential for new treatments and cures. However, to conduct this research, scientists have to 276 
get stem-cells. They have been getting them from human embryos that are less than 2 weeks old 277 
and have been frozen and stored in fertility clinics. However, these embryos will only be used for 278 
research if they are not going to be used for fertility treatments. A recently discovered way of 279 
getting them is to extract stem-cells from the blood contained in umbilical cords that people could 280 
donate to research after giving birth. The umbilical cords would in most cases be frozen and stored 281 
for future scientific use’.  282 
 283 
Following this description, respondents in U.S. and Canada were asked: ‘Overall, which of the 284 
following best captures your views about stem-cell research?’.  European respondents were given 285 
a shorter but similar description: 286 
 287 
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‘stem-cell research involves taking human cells either from human embryos that are less than 2 288 
weeks and that will never be transplanted into a women body old or from the blood in umbilical 289 
cords to grow new cells which can be used to treat certain diseases in different parts of the body’. 290 
 291 
The question posed alongside this description is very similar to the U.S. and Canadian version: 292 
‘Overall, which of the following best captures your views about using stem-cells?’  However, in 293 
Europe, respondents were asked separately for their views on research using embryonic stem-294 
cells, and research using non-embryonic stem-cells.  For the latter, they were presented with the 295 
following qualified description: ‘Suppose scientists were able to get all the stem-cells they need 296 
for research from umbilical cords and no longer had to get them from embryos’. While the two 297 
formulations of the context in which stem-cell research is to be approved or not are somewhat 298 
different, we do not have serious cause to believe that question wording differences greatly affect 299 
the comparability. 300 
 301 
The response alternatives for these questions in both surveys were as follows:  302 
 303 
I approve the use of stem-cell research, as long as the usual levels of government regulation and 304 
control are in place; 305 
I approve of stem-cell research if it is more tightly controlled and regulated; 306 
I do not approve of stem-cell research except under very special circumstances; and, 307 
I do not approve of stem-cell research under any circumstances. 308 
 309 
Bearing in mind variation in national regulatory frameworks for stem-cell research, it could be 310 
argued that the response ‘I approve the use of stem-cell research, as long as the usual regulations 311 
apply’ indicates markedly different levels of support in different countries. However, drawing on 312 
Sudman et al (29), we conjecture that respondents use the response alternatives as important cues 313 
in the interpretation of the meaning of the question. As such, they would consistently interpret the 314 
 13 
 
four alternatives as ordered categorical points representing a continuum from approval through 315 
increasing strictness of regulation to a veto.  This means that, for example, even in those contexts 316 
in which stem-cell research is not permitted by regulation, respondents who are opposed to stem-317 
cell research would select alternative 4 rather than 1. For the descriptive statistics, we dichotomise 318 
this variable to distinguish approval from disapproval, while in the regression models, we use the 319 
full scale.  320 
 321 
Measuring religious commitment 322 
We use the reported frequency of attendance at religious services as a proxy for religious 323 
commitment. Respondents in Europe were asked: ‘Apart from weddings or funerals, about how 324 
often do you attend religious services?’ Respondents in the U.S. and Canada were asked: ‘In the 325 
past, how often have you attended a service at a place of worship?’, and interviewers were given 326 
the instruction: ‘If asked, do not include weddings and funerals.’ In both surveys the response 327 
alternatives were: ‘More than once a week’; ‘At least once a week’; ‘Several times a month’; ‘At 328 
least once a month’; ‘A couple of times a year’; ‘About once a year’; and ‘Never.’ 329 
 330 
Using the reported frequency of attendance at religious services as a proxy for religious 331 
commitment clearly oversimplifies a set of complex issues regarding the nature of religious faith 332 
and practice. Nevertheless, the measure of religiosity that we employ here is in widespread use in 333 
political science and sociology (for instance, it is repeated annually in the General Social Survey 334 
(30)) and has been shown to correlate strongly with other measures of religious identity as well 335 
as political and social attitudes (31, 32).  Conceptually and empirically social scientists often 336 
distinguish between religiosity, membership and practices. A propos of this it may be asked, what 337 
of Muslims who may, simply as a matter of course, attend services more frequently than 338 
Christians? What of those with a faith who do not attend religious services?  339 
 340 
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Our justification for the simple measure of frequency of attendance is based on pragmatic 341 
grounds. In Europe, Canada and the U.S., Christianity (combining Protestants, Catholics and the 342 
Orthodox) is the dominant religion – over 70%. The Christian churches have reasonably similar 343 
patterns of services, thus it may be expected that, by and large, the frequency of church attendance 344 
is related to religious commitment. After the Christians the next largest group is atheists/agnostics 345 
at 10-15% with Muslims and Jews between 1 and 2 percent.1 Thus, in a national sample survey 346 
of 1,000 persons (as in the Eurobarometer) we would expect between 10 and 15 Muslims. As 347 
such, without much larger and costlier samples, or booster samples for certain religious groups, 348 
it is simply not worth collecting detailed information on religion, because any analysis could not 349 
be generalised with confidence. That said, a comparison between those of the Catholic and 350 
Protestant churches might have been of interest. Protestants are the largest group in the U.S. 351 
(although there are many varieties) while Catholics are the largest in Europe (33). However, this 352 
question of denomination was not asked in the U.S. and Canadian surveys.  353 
 354 
Measuring moral acceptability  and perceived benefits  of stem-cell research 355 
In the U.S. and Canada, respondents were asked:  356 
 357 
‘In terms of the moral or ethical aspect of this research, again using the 1-5 scale, where 1 means 358 
that stem-cell research is morally unacceptable, 5 means it is morally acceptable, and the mid 359 
point 3 means it is morally questionable, how do you view this kind of research?’  360 
 361 
They were also asked:  362 
 363 
                                                     
1 Authors’ own estimates from Eurobarometer 64.3 
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‘I would like to understand the extent to which you think stem-cell research might benefit our 364 
society. Using a scale of 1-5, where 1 is no benefit and 5 is substantial benefit, and the mid-point 365 
3 is moderate benefit, how beneficial do you think stem-cell research will be to our society?’  366 
 367 
In Europe, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed to the following two 368 
statements:  369 
 370 
‘It is ethically wrong to use human embryos in medical research even if it might offer promising 371 
new treatments’;  372 
 373 
‘stem-cell research will help with cures and treatments for serious diseases’.  374 
 375 
The response alternatives were: ‘Totally agree’; ‘Tend to agree’; ‘Tend to disagree’; and ‘Totally 376 
disagree’. To achieve comparability between the two surveys, the data from the U.S. and Canada 377 
were rescaled to conform to the range of 1 to 4 to match the European question. This facilitates 378 
easier comparison of effect sizes in the regression models. For the purposes of showing 379 
descriptive statistics, to enhance the clarity of the tables, responses  were recoded into a binary 380 
variable where the value of one indicates positive views (i.e. greater than 2 on the longer scaled 381 
version) and zero otherwise.  382 
 383 
 384 
 385 
 386 
Control variables  387 
In addition to these substantive variables, we also include controls for age, education and gender. 388 
Age is captured with binary variables representing age groups 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 389 
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65+. Education is measured with a set of binary variables denoting the following levels: less than 390 
high school, high school, some college or greater, still studying. We also include “don’t know” 391 
responses to this question, as there were a small but non-trivial number of these in the European 392 
sample (94). Gender is recorded as a binary indicator. 393 
 394 
Results 395 
Levels of overall support for stem-cell research vary somewhat by region.  Table 1 summarises 396 
these variations. Combining the approval scores and working across the table, we can see that 397 
Europeans are the least approving out of the three regions (62 percent), compared to the data from 398 
the U.S. (73 percent) and Canada (81 percent). The combined disapproval rates demonstrate 399 
slightly less variation - Europe (23 percent), U.S. (27 percent) and Canada (18 percent). The major 400 
difference between the regions, however, is that European respondents are far more likely to say 401 
“don’t know” (15 percent) compared to the U.S. and Canada (at most 1 percent). We must be 402 
careful in how to interpret this as it might be an artefact of the different questions wordings or 403 
fieldwork procedures. Alternatively, it might be because the issue of stem-cell research in Europe 404 
is less polarised than it is in North America allowing for Europeans to feel less inclined to making 405 
a strictly positive or negative judgement.  If we disregard “don’t know”s from the analysis then 406 
the proportions in each region expressing approval become more closely aligned.      407 
 408 
 409 
 410 
 411 
 412 
 413 
 414 
 415 
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Table 1 Attitudes towards stem-cell research in Europe, the United States and Canada 416 
 417 
% respondents within 
region/country 
Europe United 
States 
Canada 
Embryonic Non-
embryonic 
 
Mean   
Approve with usual levels of 
government regulation and 
control 
23 28 25 41 36 
Approve if more tightly 
controlled and regulated 
36 37 37 32 45 
Do not approve except under 
very special circumstances 
17 14 15 19 14 
Do not approve under any 
circumstances 
9 7 8 8 4 
Don't know 15 14 15 1 0 
Base* 10,192 10,312   1,200 1,000 
* Not all questions were asked of all respondents, hence the reduced sample sizes in Europe and 418 
the U.S. 419 
 420 
 421 
Appeals to religion have been prominent in the stem-cell debate, especially in the U.S. and in 422 
some predominantly Catholic European countries (34). Religious commitment – captured in terms 423 
of frequency of attending religious services – is typically higher in the U.S. than in Canada, and 424 
typically slightly higher in Canada than in Europe.  In our data, for example, 12 percent of 425 
Americans report attending religious services more than once a week, compared to 4 percent of 426 
Canadians and 3 percent of Europeans; by contrast, only 19 percent of American respondents 427 
attend less than once a year, compared to 31 percent of Canadians and fully 40 percent of 428 
Europeans.   429 
 430 
From the outset, we expected that greater religious commitment would be associated with weaker 431 
support for stem-cell research. We also hypothesised that religiosity would be a more important 432 
basis for approval or disapproval of stem-cell research in the U.S. compared to Canada and 433 
Europe. Table 2 shows that in all regions, approval of stem-cell research does indeed decline as 434 
religious commitment increases.  The pattern is less pronounced in Europe than in the U.S. and 435 
Canada, lending initial support for our hypothesis. It is important to note, though, that even among 436 
 18 
 
the most religious, around half of the public approves of stem-cell research in the U.S., Canada 437 
and in Europe.  438 
 439 
Table 2 Attitudes towards stem-cell research by religious attendance 440 
 441 
 
More than once a 
week 
Once a week About once a 
month 
Two times a year or 
less 
U.S.     
Approve 48 63 77 87 
Disapprove 51 35 22 12 
Don’t know 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Canada     
Approve 49 70 81 86 
Disapprove 49 30 19 14 
Don’t know 2 0 0 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Europe     
Approve 49 46 56 64 
Disapprove 26 26 24 20 
Don’t know 24 28 20 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 442 
 443 
These descriptive results suggest that religion is strongly associated with support for and 444 
opposition to stem-cell research in all regions. In the next section we present multivariate models 445 
that explore in more detail the extent to which, alongside religion, different ethical perspectives 446 
are associated with approval and how this varies by region. 447 
 448 
Multivariate models  449 
In what follows, we present a series of multivariate OLS regression models through which we can 450 
build a picture of the social and geographical bases of support for stem-cell research. The analytic 451 
sample for all of our models contains 10761 respondents. The reduction in sample size is 452 
principally due to the fact that not all questions were asked of all respondents in both of the 453 
surveys combined with some item non-response.   The first set of models (1 to 3) assesses the 454 
association with approval of region and religiosity and the interaction between these two 455 
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variables. A fourth model adds controls for age, gender and education to check the robustness of 456 
the associations observed in the first set. Two further sets of models (5-8) include moral (sanctity 457 
of life ethic) and benefit (utilitarian ethic) attitudes and, again, the interaction between these 458 
factors and region. In this way, we can assess the extent to which both moral and benefit based 459 
concerns are implicated in approval as well as the relative importance of these in determining 460 
levels of approval in the U.S., Canada and Europe. The final model (9) combines all of these 461 
variables. 462 
 463 
Table 3 presents unstandardized regression coefficients for each of these models. In model 1, 464 
dummy variables for Canada and the U.S. have positive coefficients, which confirm what we saw 465 
in the bivariate tables presented earlier: namely, that levels of approval are higher in North 466 
America than in Europe. In model 2 we add religiosity and confirm, again, that people for whom 467 
religion is more important are less approving of stem-cell research, irrespective of the continent 468 
in which they live. Our first hypothesis was that religion would be more important in 469 
understanding attitudes to stem-cell research in the U.S. than elsewhere. In model 3 we include 470 
product-term interactions of religiosity and region and find that the negative association of 471 
religiosity with approval in the U.S. is indeed stronger than in Canada and Europe. The 472 
statistically significant coefficient for this interaction is -0.08, which, when combined with the 473 
main effect for religiosity of -0.11, means that each unit increase in the religiosity scale is 474 
associated with a decline in approval of around 0.2 for U.S. citizens. This relationship is robust 475 
when we control for age, gender and education in model 5, with little change in the coefficients 476 
denoting region. 477 
 478 
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Table 3 OLS regression models predicting approval of stem-cell research (unstandardized estimates and t-values) 479 
 480 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
U.S. 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.30*** 
 (13.17) (16.19) (16.32) (15.83) (11.84) (7.86) (18.38) (18.74) (12.00) 
          
CAN 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.29*** 
 (13.16) (13.76) (13.69) (13.44) (9.89) (7.97) (17.04) (16.97) (11.52) 
          
Religiosity  -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 
  (-16.82) (-13.52) (-11.84) (-8.61) (-9.25) (-7.53) (-6.93) (-5.13) 
          
Relig x U.S.   -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.05* 0.02 -0.02 -0.04* -0.00 
   (-3.54) (-4.05) (-2.14) (0.95) (-1.06) (-2.33) (-0.16) 
          
Relig x CAN   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
   (-1.09) (-1.37) (-0.81) (0.15) (0.07) (-1.43) (-0.83) 
          
Female    -0.06*** -0.04** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03** 
    (-3.69) (-2.67) (-3.05) (-3.64) (-3.37) (-2.67) 
          
25-34    0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
    (0.50) (0.42) (0.37) (-0.02) (0.02) (-0.00) 
          
35-44    0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
    (1.51) (0.95) (0.85) (0.67) (0.77) (0.38) 
          
45-54    0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
    (0.64) (0.04) (0.00) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.89) 
          
55-64    -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08** 
    (-0.22) (-1.27) (-1.38) (-1.80) (-1.90) (-2.71) 
          
65+    -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
    (-0.15) (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-1.92) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
          
          
High school    0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.02 0.02 0.01 
    (3.12) (2.74) (2.92) (1.14) (0.87) (0.75) 
          
College+    0.23*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
    (9.15) (7.72) (7.77) (4.81) (4.44) (3.63) 
          
Still studying    0.22*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.09** 0.08* 0.07 
    (5.27) (4.47) (4.52) (2.60) (2.34) (1.87) 
          
EducationDK    0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
    (0.52) (0.29) (0.31) (0.04) (-0.00) (-0.14) 
          
Moral     0.24*** 0.20***   0.13*** 
     (30.35) (22.46)   (16.29) 
          
Moral x U.S.      0.25***   0.17*** 
      (10.11)   (7.01) 
          
Moral x CAN      0.14***   0.12*** 
      (5.19)   (4.39) 
          
Benefit       0.56*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 
       (63.07) (59.06) (57.09) 
          
Ben x U.S.        -0.16*** -0.31*** 
        (-6.56) (-11.33) 
          
Ben x CAN        -0.25*** -0.35*** 
        (-8.90) (-11.43) 
R2 0.028 0.053 0.038 0.056 0.136 0.144 0.316 0.324 0.356 
t statistics in parentheses. N=10761 481 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 482 
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 483 
Looking across table 3 to model 6, we introduce our measure of moral judgment on stem-cell 484 
research. The effect is statistically significant and positive – in other words, the belief that stem-485 
cell research is morally acceptable is associated with its approval. More interesting is that when 486 
we examine the interaction between region and moral attitude, we find a significant positive effect 487 
for both Canada and the U.S. That is to say, moral attitudes are more consequential for public 488 
approval in both North American countries compared to Europe. 489 
 490 
In models 7 to 9 we test the same idea, only in this case with beliefs about the potential benefits 491 
of stem-cell research. The coefficient for benefit (0.56) in model 7 is substantial and statistically 492 
significant. Approval of stem-cell research is strongly tied to beliefs about its potential benefits. 493 
This comes as no surprise: the more people believe that benefits will flow from stem-cell research, 494 
the more likely they are to approve of it. To see whether these beliefs are more or less important 495 
in different regions, in model 8 we add the interaction terms as we did for moral attitudes. We 496 
find that they are negative for both Canada and the U.S:  the effect of benefit beliefs on approval 497 
is smaller in North America than in Europe. That is to say that how useful North Americans 498 
believe stem-cell research to be is less important than it is for Europeans in determining how 499 
likely they are to approve of it. In the final model, we simultaneously fit both interactions. The 500 
results are substantively unchanged, with all the interaction terms remaining significant and of 501 
similar magnitude. Important also to note is that our final model explains more than 30 percent of 502 
the variation in approval for stem-cell research. While this leaves open the possibility that other 503 
systematic unmeasured factors are important for a full understanding of public opinion on the 504 
issue, it does mean that the dimensions we have investigated here are of substantial importance.    505 
 506 
 507 
 508 
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Robustness check 509 
In treating 25 European countries a single bloc, we of course run the risk of masking substantial 510 
heterogeneity. To check whether this was a significant problem, we re-estimated the models 511 
within each of the 25 countries separately. We found that the pattern of coefficients was very 512 
similar within each European country to the overall results treating countries as a bloc as reported 513 
above. In particular, no European country’s ranking in the size of coefficients for moral and 514 
benefit resemble those for the U.S. and Canada. We are confident, therefore, that we have 515 
identified dimensions of difference that are substantially ‘transatlantic’ in nature.    516 
 517 
Discussion 518 
Despite elite voices that have been critical of stem-cell research in Europe, Canada and the U.S., 519 
the majority of the public has been supportive for the past decade. But the fault lines of 520 
contemporary bioethics are reflected in public views. Religion plays an important part in many 521 
people’s lives, especially in the U.S., yet in the case of stem-cell research it does not always result 522 
in positions of closure, pitting science against religion or religious versus secular world-views. 523 
While a small majority of the most religious want a veto on stem-cell research, many equally 524 
religious people have been willing to support it. 525 
 526 
Our findings are consistent with the premise that public views on stem-cell research are framed 527 
by at least two key dimensions – moral concerns and beliefs about benefits. Although it would be 528 
unwise from survey data such as this to conclude that publics are weighing formal ethical 529 
positions against each other, we believe that the attitudinal positions we identify in our analyses 530 
to some degree map on to conventional ethical positions towards human life: namely, the sanctity 531 
of life and the quality of life. Even taking into account standard demographic groupings, 532 
perceptions of the benefits and of the moral acceptability of stem-cell research point to differences 533 
in views that go beyond what one might expect based on, for instance, religious and educational 534 
 24 
 
cleavages in the population. That is to say, both the more and less religious can differ in how 535 
much these two ethical dimensions underpin their opinions about stem-cell research. Moreover, 536 
the relative importance of these ethical positions differs not only between individual citizens but 537 
also between the U.S., Canada and Europe. In Europe particularly, given the greater relative 538 
importance of perceived benefits of stem-cell research, public support is likely to be strongly 539 
conditional on perceived progress towards the promised cures for diseases. In the U.S., where 540 
considerations of moral acceptability assume more importance than consideration of benefits, 541 
continued support for stem-cell research may be conditional to a greater extent on how embryonic 542 
stem-cells are obtained. whether political debate develops in a direction that emphasises sanctity 543 
of life over other considerations. At all events, the benefits need to be perceived as greater by 544 
Americans compared Europeans in order to be persuasive in the face of strong moral concerns.  545 
 546 
Finally, while support for stem-cell research has grown in the U.S. during the past decade, there 547 
are political currents that exist – for instance the partisan positions on abortion – that may yet lead 548 
to a reversal of the trend. Some commentators have suggested that we have entered a ‘post-truth’ 549 
era (35). At the same time, newly inaugurated President Donald Trump was elected on an anti-550 
abortion ticket. With this in mind, we might expect to see shared values and norms, or indeed 551 
‘public ethics’, becoming even more relevant for understanding how sensitive technologies enter 552 
into the public sphere and how public policy is framed in response.   553 
 554 
 555 
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Abstract 33 
We examine international public opinion towards stem-cell research during the period when the 34 
issue was at its most contentious. We draw upon representative sample surveys in Europe and 35 
North America, fielded in 2005, and find that the majority of people in Europe, Canada and the 36 
United States supported stem-cell research, providing it was tightly regulated, but that there were 37 
key differences between the geographical regions in the relative importance of different types of 38 
ethical position. the weighing of ethical positions. In the U.S., moral acceptability was more 39 
influential as a driver ofin support forof stem-cell research; in Europe the perceived benefit to 40 
society carried more weight; and in Canada the two were almost equally important. We also find 41 
that public opinion on stem-cell research was more strongly associated with religious convictions 42 
in the U.S. than in Canada and Europe, although many strongly religious citizens in all regions 43 
approved of stem-cell research. Religious beliefs were important in public objections to stem-cell 44 
research, particularly in the U.S., because they helped to resolve the dilemma posed by the ethical 45 
positions of ‘sanctity of life’ and of ‘quality of life’ in stem-cell research debates. Yet, not all 46 
religious individuals rejected stem-cell research – in fact, the dilemma between ‘sanctity of life’ 47 
and ‘quality of life’ played out amongst the religious and non-religious alike. We conclude that if 48 
anything public opinion or ‘public ethics’ are likely to play an increasingly n important role in 49 
framing policy and regulatory regimes for sensitive technologies in the future.for the foreseeable 50 
future. 51 
 52 
 53 
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Introduction 61 
A number of development trajectories in the domain of modern biotechnology – most notably the 62 
fate of GM food in Europe – have demonstrated the centrality of public concerns in sustainable 63 
technology development. The reception of new technologies by the public is linked to judgements 64 
about risks and benefits, but it is also based on ethical issues and general ideas about ‘how we 65 
want to live,’ and this is particularly the case for sensitive technologies in the life sciences. Given 66 
the ongoing explosion of new gene-based technologies such as synthetic biology, cloning, gene 67 
editingtic modification and personalized medicine, we seek in this paper to add historical context 68 
to such debates by examining an exemplar case – that of human embryonic stem-cell research.  69 
 70 
The history of political and public debates about novel interventions in the process of reproduction 71 
appears to repeat itself. Recent controversies over the future of stem-cell research (1, 2)  echo 72 
elements of earlier debates on contraception and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), but they also 73 
prefigure more recent ones on synthetic biology and gene editing (3, 4). , and aAt the centre of 74 
these debates is the question: ‘what are the limits to human intervention in matters of life?’ 75 
Offering the opportunity of sex without reproduction, contraception was considered by some to 76 
be an aberration and a threat to the moral order. Much the same was said of IVF, which brought 77 
the possibility of reproduction without sex., Yyet with some exceptions both contraception and 78 
IVF are now broadly accepted and in widespread use.have progressed from anathema to 79 
widespread use and acceptance. 80 
 81 
Two decades have passed since ‘Dolly’ the cloned sheep swept the world’s headlines, generating 82 
a fleeting moment of moral consensus outrage over the boundaries of acceptable interference in 83 
creation (5). Research has continued and; the debate has become more nuanced, most notably 84 
after the isolation of embryonic stem-cells; and we saw the distinction between therapeutic and 85 
reproductive cloning being developed in public discourse (6). As research evolved into the new 86 
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millennium, stem-cell research became one of the most contested issues in science policy making. 87 
While stem-cell research is heralded as a major breakthrough in biomedical science, as Nielsen 88 
notes, it was ‘attained with cloning having the dubious status of the most promising as well as the 89 
most controversial among the many emerging biotechnologies’ (7). The National Research 90 
Council in the U.S. wrote that stem-cell research has led ‘scientists and non-scientists alike to 91 
contemplate profound issues, such as who we are and what makes us human beings.’ (8). 92 
Public ethics 93 
Alongside elite discourse and debate, amongst scientists, legislators, regulators and ethicists, the 94 
opinions of lay publics have been, – and continue to be, – critically important. We use the term 95 
‘public ethics’ not because we assume that public opinions are necessarily evidence of intensive 96 
deliberation or elaboration by the public such as that practiced by professional ethicists. Rather it 97 
is because we regard it as plausible to map some important attitudinal dimensions onto established 98 
ethical principles or moral positions. The reason for this comes from recent thinking in empirical 99 
moral psychology. In this field, recognized ethical and moral positions are regarded as 100 
formalisations of existing more fundamental attitudes and intuitions, rather than the latter being 101 
led by the former (9).  This being the case, such pPublic ethics or opinions can act to constrain or 102 
enable scientific and technological development in democratic societies (10). Where such 103 
developments taps into especially ‘hot button’ issues or themes, public attitudes can, and do, come 104 
to the attention of politicians and regulators and sometimes have palpable effects on policy 105 
regimes and funding priorities. For example, the unofficial EU moratorium on commercial 106 
planting of genetically modified (GM) crops was one of the higher profile instances of politics 107 
and science colliding in the form of a World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute. European public 108 
opinion was – and remains – negative, and very few GM crops are farmed in Europe, despite a 109 
scientific consensus for their safety. To uUnderlininge this, one of the key biotech firms, BASF, 110 
moved its research operations to the U.S. in 2012, citing consumer resistance (11, 12).  That the 111 
controversy over GM crops led to a World Trade Organisation trade dispute between the U.S. and 112 
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the EU underscores the importance of a comparative approach to understanding the foundations 113 
for public opinion about contentious science and technology. To cite another contemporary 114 
example, within the US, public beliefs about anthropocentric global warming split along partisan 115 
lines (13) and the policy positions of Democrats and Republicans have to be understood in the 116 
context of the opinions of their supporters.   Different nationalcultural  and cultural sensitivities 117 
mean therefore that it cannot be assumed that public opinion towards new scientific and 118 
technological developments will align in the same way in different parts of the world or in 119 
different socio-political contexts.   120 
 121 
The first step for the current paper is to investigate and map out   cross-national differences in 122 
public opinion on stem-cell research. The second is to examine what may underlie such 123 
differences as are observed, such that, once such common factors are accounted for, these cross-124 
national differences are attenuated or eliminated. Drawing on data from three comparative social 125 
surveys, which together captured public opinion in Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada at a 126 
time when the stem-cell debate was at its height (in the mid-2000s), we investigate factors 127 
underlying divergences in public perceptions. Of particular interest in the current analysis 128 
research is the extent to which particular attitudes underlying approval of stem-cell research 129 
assume ethical perspectives have similar, or varying importance, currency in different parts of the 130 
world. 131 
 132 
Stem-cell research and ethical dilemmas for policy makers 133 
The controversies surrounding human embryonic stem-cell research bring into focus two ideal-134 
type ethical positions or world-views, which we could refer to as characterise as thea ‘sanctity of 135 
life’ ethic and athe ‘quality of life’ ethic. The ‘sanctity of life’ ethic outlines a deontological 136 
position that sees the embryo as a human being that, as such, possesses rights that are inviolable. 137 
Given that stem-cell research involves the destruction of embryos, it would be unethical to pursue 138 
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it (14). By contrast, athe ‘quality of life’ ethic argues for a utilitarian approach: a paramount duty 139 
to alleviate suffering, and given that this research may lead to cures for some serious diseases, it 140 
would be unethical not to pursue it.  141 
 142 
A starting premise of our study is that, when considering the viability of stem-cell research, 143 
researchers, politicians, regulators and the public at large are confronted by a classic dilemma: 144 
namely, how to come to terms with these two competing perspectives, based, as they are, on 145 
deeply held beliefs about what is ethical and desirable versus what is unethical and undesirable.. 146 
Across Europe, the United States and Canada, politicians and regulators have adopted different 147 
resolutions to this dilemma. An adoption of a polarisation of the ‘sanctity of life’ position versus 148 
the ‘quality of life’ position was initially evident in the U.S., where the Bush administration 149 
limited federally funded stem-cell research to the use of a small number of existing cell lines. 150 
Congressional bills to allow the federal government to fund embryonic stem-cell research using 151 
supernumerary embryos from fertility clinics were vetoed by President Bush in July 2006 and 152 
2007. The premise of this position was 153 
 154 
‘…not an attempt to answer the question of how the government might best advance embryonic 155 
stem-cell research while conforming to the law on the subject. Rather, it [was] an attempt to 156 
answer the question of how the government might avoid encouraging the (presumptively) 157 
unethical act of embryo destruction and still advance the worthy cause of medical research.’ (15) 158 
 159 
Some gGovernments across the EU likewise issued similar cautious edicts based on concern for 160 
the sanctity of life vested in human embryos. In November 2005 an ethical declaration was signed 161 
by Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovakia that called for the exclusion 162 
of any kind of stem-cell research from European public funding under the seventh framework 163 
programme for research that ran from 2007 to 2013. 164 
 165 
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In the U.S., the policy position adopted by the Bush administration was reversed in 2009 when 166 
an Executive Order was issued by President Barack Obama: 167 
 168 
‘For the past 8 years, the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services, including 169 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to fund and conduct human embryonic stem-cell research 170 
has been limited by Presidential actions.  The purpose of this order is to remove these limitations 171 
on scientific inquiry, to expand NIH support for the exploration of human stem-cell research, and 172 
in so doing to enhance the contribution of America's scientists to important new discoveries and 173 
new therapies for the benefit of humankind.’ (16) 174 
 175 
This lifting of restrictions on federal funding of stem-cell research arguably now placed the U.S. 176 
alongside ‘quality of life’ proponents found in some EU member states. In Denmark, Greece, 177 
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain a liberal form of regulation allows for the procurement 178 
of stem-cell research from supernumerary embryos. Belgium, Sweden and the UK took a step 179 
further, legalising the creation of human embryos for the procurement of embryonic stem-cells, 180 
but only under strict conditions.  181 
 182 
Despite some national differences within Europe on the issue of stem-cell research, notably in 183 
Germany and Portugal (17), the European Union adopted a compromise position, albeit leaning 184 
towards a regime where research could take place. the ‘quality of life’ ethic. In June 2006 the EU 185 
Parliament approved the Commission’s proposal to support the use of public funds for stem-cell 186 
research. Subsequently, the European Council of Ministers agreed to a compromise allow ing the 187 
use of public funds for stem-cell research, and only but to prohibiting the use of public funds for 188 
the procurement of new embryonic stem-cell lines. This echoes the policy climate in Canada, 189 
which legalised stem-cell research in 2004 on embryos that are surplus from fertility clinics, but 190 
retained a ban on therapeutic cloning and the creation of embryos for research. 191 
 192 
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Across the three regions we can see, then, three distinct policy climates, ranging from a negative 193 
policy of restriction in the U.S. under the Bush administration, to a compromise position in 194 
Canada, to a position of broadly positive engagement in Europe. It has been argued that this kind 195 
of variation in regulatory regimes exists partly due to the strong influence of religion on politics 196 
in the U.S. in relation to Western Europe and to a lesser extent Canada (18). This view perhaps 197 
overstates the causal influence of religion on political attitudes, but it is nevertheless true that 198 
conservative ideologies tend at least to be associated closely with religious culture in the U.S. and 199 
can beare often couched expressed more in 'moral' imperatives rather than the more liberal 200 
concerns of equality and collective utility (19). This religio-cultural climate is often contrasted 201 
with the more secular-based style of government in Western Europe, particularly when 202 
considering questions are asked about the influence of prevailing religious norms on social and 203 
political attitudes (20). 204 
  205 
 206 
The present research 207 
Since embryonic stem-cell research came to public attention in the early 2000s, the broad trend 208 
for public perceptions has been for either stability or a relaxing of concerns. These trends have 209 
also led towards greater convergence in public opinion internationally, although the bases on 210 
which public perceptions are founded may be quite different. Understanding these bases is the 211 
focus of the present enquiry. According to the Virginia Commonwealth University Life Science 212 
Survey series (a nationally representative random-digit-dial survey),  public support for stem-cell  213 
research in the U.S. rose from 40 percent in 2002 to around 65 percent in 2010 (21). Another 214 
survey, carried out in 2005 by Knowledge Networks on behalf of the Genetics & Public Policy 215 
Center, found that 67 percent of Americans approved of stem-cell research. Interestingly, while 216 
overall approval was high, the same survey found that all but 12 percent of respondents held at 217 
least some conflicting views about the need to preserve embryos versus the need to pursue 218 
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research (22). That attitudes were far from unambiguous illustrates the need to look beyond simple 219 
approval ratings in order to understand public views on stem-cell research.  220 
 221 
 When it was last systematically measured with Eurobarometer surveys (23, 24), the percentage 222 
of Europeans approving of embryonic stem-cell research with either usual, or tighter regulations, 223 
was around 65 percent in both 2005 and in 2010.,  In Canada, the most recent evidence comes 224 
from an Angus Reid survey, which estimated the moral acceptability of stem-cell research was 225 
espoused by 65 percent of adult Canadians (25).  226 
 227 
While we have some evidence that attitudes between our three regions have converged in recent 228 
times, our interest in the current study is in understanding what the differing bases of these 229 
attitudes were at a time when debate was at its height and most salient in the minds of the public, 230 
in the mid-2000s. The variation between the U.S., Canada and Europe in styles of governance, 231 
regulatory  and regulatory regimes and cultural contexts provides a useful comparative framework 232 
to explore differences in attitudes towards stem-cell research. One of the hypotheses that we 233 
assess in what follows is that national differences in approval of stem-cell research may be 234 
explained by different levels of religiosity. It would seem valid to assume that populations find it 235 
easier to adopt positive attitudes towards stem-cell research when religious and socially 236 
conservative norms are less prevalent and governments actively encourage stem-cell research and 237 
other biotechnologies. If true, then wFurthermore, we would expect to see religiosity as being 238 
associated with more negative attitudes towards stem-cell research. , and mMoreover, we would 239 
expect to see this relationship having its strongest effect in the U.S., then Canada, and finally 240 
Europe. 241 
 242 
Going beyond religiosity itself, the foregoing suggests that the ethical perspectives associated 243 
with religious versus secular based governance might also be reflected in the roots of public 244 
attitudes in these different regions. We would expect, therefore, that moral concerns a ‘sanctity 245 
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of life’ ethic wereas more influential for Americans and Canadians than it was for Western 246 
Europeans in coming to a judgment about stem-cell research. Concomitantly, we would also 247 
expect that considerations of benefits more than moral concerns a ‘quality of life’ ethic hashave 248 
played a greater role for public attitudes in Western Europe than across the Atlantic. To 249 
summarise then, our research questions, which we seek to answer with data gathered during this 250 
critical period, are as follows: 251 
 252 
 What is the difference between the U.S., Canada and Western Europe in levels of public 253 
approval of stem-cell research? 254 
 255 
 What is the influence of each of two types of ethical consideration perspectives on 256 
approval – ‘sanctity of life’moral concerns and and ‘quality of life’perceptions of 257 
benefits? 258 
 259 
 How do these influences vary in their importance across the U.S., Canada and Western 260 
Europe? 261 
 262 
To answer these questions, we test a series of regression models to demonstrate firstly the extent 263 
to which attitudes differ between the U.S., Canada and Western Europe, after accounting for 264 
differences in the demographic composition of the three regions. Secondly we assess the role of 265 
ethical considerations using two variables that broadly capture moral (sanctity of life) and benefit-266 
based (or utilitarian)  (quality of life) concerns. Finally, we investigate the relative importance of 267 
these ethical considerations perspectives across the three regions.   268 
 269 
 270 
 271 
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 272 
Data and methods 273 
The surveys 274 
Eurobarometer 64.3 on Biotechnology was the sixth in the series of surveys of public perceptions 275 
of biotechnology that began in 1991. The survey was fielded in 2005 in 25 member states of the 276 
European Union and afforded a unique opportunity to carry out comparative research between 277 
Europe and North America, with a set of harmonised questions being asked in each region. Multi-278 
stage random sampling procedures were used to provide a statistically representative sample of 279 
national residents aged 15 and over, with a total sample of circa 25,000 respondents interviewed 280 
face to face (26). The Canadian Biotechnology Strategy Secretariat's ‘International Public 281 
Opinion Research on Emerging Technologies’ survey was conducted during January and 282 
February 2005 in Canada and in the U.S.. Random digit dialling was used to select a representative 283 
probability samples of 2,000 respondents in Canada and 1,200 respondents in the U.S., all aged 284 
18 years or above, who were interviewed by telephone (27, 28). Both the the Canadian and 285 
European surveys had a split-ballot design where only a random half of the respondents were 286 
asked all of the questions included in the analyses presented here. 287 
 288 
The response variable: support for stem-cell research 289 
Canadian and U.S. respondents were given the following description: 290 
 291 
‘stem-cell research involves the use of special human cells to study diseases and their cures. stem-292 
cells have the unique ability to grow into any type of cell in the human body. stem-cell research 293 
has led to breakthroughs in our understanding of diabetes, MS, and Parkinson’s disease that offer 294 
the potential for new treatments and cures. However, to conduct this research, scientists have to 295 
get stem-cells. They have been getting them from human embryos that are less than 2 weeks old 296 
 12 
 
and have been frozen and stored in fertility clinics. However, these embryos will only be used for 297 
research if they are not going to be used for fertility treatments. A recently discovered way of 298 
getting them is to extract stem-cells from the blood contained in umbilical cords that people could 299 
donate to research after giving birth. The umbilical cords would in most cases be frozen and stored 300 
for future scientific use’.  301 
 302 
Following this description, respondents in U.S. and Canada were asked: ‘Overall, which of the 303 
following best captures your views about stem-cell research?’.  European respondents were given 304 
a shorter but similar description: 305 
 306 
‘stem-cell research involves taking human cells either from human embryos that are less than 2 307 
weeks and that will never be transplanted into a women body old or from the blood in umbilical 308 
cords to grow new cells which can be used to treat certain diseases in different parts of the body’. 309 
 310 
The question posed alongside this description is very similar to the U.S. and Canadian version: 311 
‘Overall, which of the following best captures your views about using stem-cells?’  However, in 312 
Europe, respondents were asked separately for their views on research using embryonic stem-313 
cells, and research using non-embryonic stem-cells.  For the latter, they were presented with the 314 
following qualified description: ‘Suppose scientists were able to get all the stem-cells they need 315 
for research from umbilical cords and no longer had to get them from embryos’. While the two 316 
formulations of the context in which stem-cell research is to be approved or not are somewhat 317 
different, we do not have serious cause to believe that question wording differences greatly affect 318 
the comparability. 319 
 320 
The response alternatives for these questions in both surveys were as follows:  321 
 322 
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I approve the use of stem-cell research, as long as the usual levels of government regulation and 323 
control are in place; 324 
I approve of stem-cell research if it is more tightly controlled and regulated; 325 
I do not approve of stem-cell research except under very special circumstances; and, 326 
I do not approve of stem-cell research under any circumstances. 327 
 328 
Bearing in mind variation in national regulatory frameworks for stem-cell research, it could be 329 
argued that the response ‘I approve the use of stem-cell research, as long as the usual regulations 330 
apply’ indicates markedly different levels of support in different countries. However, drawing on 331 
Sudman et al (29), we conjecture that respondents use the response alternatives as important cues 332 
in the interpretation of the meaning of the question. As such, they would consistently interpret the 333 
four alternatives as ordered categorical points representing a continuum from approval through 334 
increasing strictness of regulation to a veto.  This means that, for example, even in those contexts 335 
in which stem-cell research is not permitted by regulation, respondents who are opposed to stem-336 
cell research would select alternative 4 rather than 1. For the descriptive statistics, we dichotomise 337 
this variable to distinguish approval from disapproval, while in the regression models, we use the 338 
full scale.  339 
 340 
Measuring religious commitment 341 
We use the reported frequency of attendance at religious services as a proxy for religious 342 
commitment. Respondents in Europe were asked: ‘Apart from weddings or funerals, about how 343 
often do you attend religious services?’ Respondents in the U.S. and Canada were asked: ‘In the 344 
past, how often have you attended a service at a place of worship?’, and interviewers were given 345 
the instruction: ‘If asked, do not include weddings and funerals.’ In both surveys the response 346 
alternatives were: ‘More than once a week’; ‘At least once a week’; ‘Several times a month’; ‘At 347 
least once a month’; ‘A couple of times a year’; ‘About once a year’; and ‘Never.’ 348 
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 349 
Using the reported frequency of attendance at religious services as a proxy for religious 350 
commitment clearly oversimplifies a set of complex issues regarding the nature of religious faith 351 
and practice. Nevertheless, the measure of religiosity that we employ here is in widespread use in 352 
political science and sociology (for instance, it is repeated annually in the General Social Survey 353 
(30)) and has been shown to correlate strongly with other measures of religious identity as well 354 
as political and social attitudes (31, 32).  Conceptually and empirically social scientists often 355 
distinguish between religiosity,  – the dimensions of religious beliefs – and membership and 356 
practices. A propos of this Equally, iit may be asked, what of Muslims who may, simply as a 357 
matter of course, attend services more frequently than Christians? What of those with a faith who 358 
do not attend religious services?  359 
 360 
Our justification for the simple measure of frequency of attendance is based on pragmatic 361 
grounds. In Europe, Canada and the U.S., Christianity (combining Protestants, Catholics and the 362 
Orthodox) is the dominant religion – over 70%. The Christian churches have reasonably similar 363 
patterns of services, thus it may be expected that, by and large, the frequency of church attendance 364 
is related to religious commitment. After the Christians the next largest group is atheists/agnostics 365 
at 10-15% with Muslims and Jews between 1 and 2 percent.1 Thus, in a national sample survey 366 
of 1,000 persons (as in the Eurobarometer) we would expect between 10 and 15 Muslims. As 367 
such, without much larger and costlier samples, or booster samples for certain religious groups, 368 
it is simply not worth collecting detailed information on religion, because any analysis could not 369 
be generalised with confidence. That said, a comparison between those of the Catholic and 370 
Protestant churches might have been of interest. Protestants are the largest group in the U.S. 371 
(although there are many varieties) while Catholics are the largest in Europe (33). However, this 372 
question of denomination was not asked in the U.S. and Canadian surveys.  373 
                                                    
1 Authors’ own estimates from Eurobarometer 64.3 
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 374 
Measuring moral acceptability (sanctity of life) and perceived benefits (quality of life) of stem-375 
cell research 376 
In the U.S. and Canada, respondents were asked:  377 
 378 
‘In terms of the moral or ethical aspect of this research, again using the 1-5 scale, where 1 means 379 
that stem-cell research is morally unacceptable, 5 means it is morally acceptable, and the mid 380 
point 3 means it is morally questionable, how do you view this kind of research?’  381 
 382 
They were also asked:  383 
 384 
‘I would like to understand the extent to which you think stem-cell research might benefit our 385 
society. Using a scale of 1-5, where 1 is no benefit and 5 is substantial benefit, and the mid-point 386 
3 is moderate benefit, how beneficial do you think stem-cell research will be to our society?’  387 
 388 
In Europe, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed to the following two 389 
statements:  390 
 391 
‘It is ethically wrong to use human embryos in medical research even if it might offer promising 392 
new treatments’;  393 
 394 
‘stem-cell research will help with cures and treatments for serious diseases’.  395 
 396 
The response alternatives were: ‘Totally agree’; ‘Tend to agree’; ‘Tend to disagree’; and ‘Totally 397 
disagree’. To achieve comparability between the two surveys, the data from the U.S. and Canada 398 
were rescaled to conform to the range of 1 to 4 to match the European question. This facilitates 399 
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easier comparison of effect sizes in the regression models. a 4-point scale (by multiplying the 400 
score by 0.8), and For the purposes of showing descriptive statistics, to enhance the clarity of the 401 
tables, responses values were recoded into a binary variable where the value of one indicates 402 
positive views (i.e. greater than 2 on the longer scaled version) and zero otherwise.  and zero 403 
indicates negative views. 404 
 405 
 406 
 407 
 408 
Control variables  409 
In addition to these substantive variables, we also include controls for age, education and gender. 410 
Age is captured with dummy binary variables representing age groups 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-411 
54, 55-64, 65+ (reference category 15-24). Education is measured with a set of dummy binary 412 
variables denoting the following levels: less than high school, high school, some college or 413 
greater, still studying. We also include “don’t know” responses to this question, as there were a 414 
small but non-trivial number of these in the European sample (50194). Gender is recorded as a 415 
binary indicator. 416 
 417 
Results 418 
Levels of overall support for stem-cell research vary somewhat by region.  Table 1 summarises 419 
these variations. Combining the approval scores and working across the table, we can see that 420 
Europeans are the least approving out of the three regions (62 percent), compared to the data from 421 
the U.S. (73 percent) and Canada (81 percent). The combined disapproval rates demonstrate 422 
slightly less variation - Europe (23 percent), U.S. (27 percent) and Canada (18 percent). The major 423 
difference between the regions, however, is that European respondents are far more likely to say 424 
“don’t know” (15 percent) compared to the U.S. and Canada (at most 1 percent). We must be 425 
Formatted: Highlight
 17 
 
careful in how to interpret this as it might be an artefact of the different questions wordings or 426 
fieldwork procedures. Alternatively, it might be because the issue of stem-cell research in Europe 427 
is less polarised than it is in North America allowing for Europeans to feel less pressured inclined 428 
toin making a strictly positive or negative judgement.  If we disregard ‘don’t know“don’t know”’s 429 
from the analysis then the proportions in each region expressing approval become more closely 430 
aligned.      431 
 432 
 433 
 434 
 435 
 436 
 437 
 438 
 439 
Table 1 Attitudes towards stem-cell research in Europe, the United States and Canada 440 
 441 
% respondents within 
region/country 
Europe United 
States 
Canada 
Embryonic Non-
embryonic 
 
Mean   
Approve with usual levels of 
government regulation and 
control 
23 28 25 41 36 
Approve if more tightly 
controlled and regulated 
36 37 37 32 45 
Do not approve except under 
very special circumstances 
17 14 15 19 14 
Do not approve under any 
circumstances 
9 7 8 8 4 
Don't know 15 14 15 1 0 
BaseN* 10,192 10,312   1,200 1,000 
* Not all questions were asked of all respondents, hence the reduced sample sizes in Europe and 442 
the U.S. 443 
 444 
 445 
Appeals to religion have been prominent in the stem-cell debate, especially in the U.S. and in 446 
some predominantly Catholic European countries (34). Religious commitment – captured in terms 447 
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of frequency of attending religious services – is typically higher in the U.S. than in Canada, and 448 
typically slightly higher in Canada than in Europe.  In our data, for example, 12 percent of 449 
Americans report attending religious services more than once a week, compared to 4 percent of 450 
Canadians and 3 percent of Europeans; by contrast, only 19 percent of American respondents 451 
attend less than once a year, compared to 31 percent of Canadians and fully 40 percent of 452 
Europeans.   453 
 454 
From the outset, we expected that greater religious commitment would be associated with weaker 455 
support for stem-cell research, given that almost all of our sample are Christians of some type. 456 
We also hypothesised that religiosity would be a more important basis for approval or disapproval 457 
of stem-cell research in the U.S. compared to Canada and Europe. Table 2 shows that in all 458 
regions, approval of stem-cell research does indeed decline as religious commitment increases.  459 
The pattern is less pronounced in Europe than in the U.S. and Canada, lending initial support for 460 
our hypothesis. It is important to note, though, that even among the most religious, around half of 461 
the public approves of stem-cell research in the U.S., Canada and in Europe.  462 
 463 
Table 2 Attitudes towards stem-cell research by religious attendance 464 
 465 
 
More than once a 
week 
Once a week About once a 
month 
Two times a year or 
less 
U.S.     
Approve 48 63 77 87 
Disapprove 51 35 22 12 
Don’t know 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Canada     
Approve 49 70 81 86 
Disapprove 49 30 19 14 
Don’t know 2 0 0 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Europe     
Approve 49 46 56 64 
Disapprove 26 26 24 20 
Don’t know 24 28 20 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 466 
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 467 
These descriptive results suggest that religion is strongly associated with support for and 468 
opposition to stem-cell research in all regions. In the next section we present multivariate models 469 
that explore in more detail the extent to which, alongside religion, different ethical perspectives 470 
are associated with approval and how this varies by region. 471 
 472 
Multivariate models  473 
In what follows, we present a series of multivariate OLS regression models through which we can 474 
build a picture of the social and geographical bases of support for stem-cell research. The analytic 475 
sample for all of our models contains 10761 respondents. The reduction in sample size is mainly 476 
principally due to the fact that not all questions were asked of all respondents in both of the 477 
surveys combined with some item non-response. The European sample contained a split ballot 478 
design wherein only half the sample were asked about stem-cell research. All of the U.S. and 479 
Canadian respondents were asked about stem-cell research.   The first set of models (1 to 3) 480 
assesses the association with approval of region and religiosity and the interaction between these 481 
two variables. A fourth model adds controls for age, gender and education to check the robustness 482 
of the associations observed in the first set. Two further sets of models (5-8) include moral 483 
(sanctity of life ethic) and benefit (utilitarian ethic) attitudes and, again, the interaction between 484 
these factors and region. In this way, we can assess the extent to which both moral and benefit 485 
based concerns are implicated in approval as well as the relative importance of these in 486 
determining levels of approval in the U.S., Canada and Europe. The final model (9) combines all 487 
of these variables. 488 
 489 
Table 3 presents unstandardized regression coefficients for each of these models. In model 1, 490 
dummy variables for Canada and the U.S. have positive coefficients, which confirm what we saw 491 
in the bivariate tables presented earlier: namely, that levels of approval are higher in North 492 
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America than in Europe. In model 2 we add religiosity and confirm, again, that people for whom 493 
religion is more important are less approving of stem-cell research, irrespective of the continent 494 
in which they live. Our first hypothesis was that religion would be more important in 495 
understanding attitudes to stem-cell research in the U.S. than elsewhere. In model 3 we include 496 
product-term interactions of religiosity and region and find that the negative association of 497 
religiosity with approval in the U.S. is indeed stronger than in Canada and Europe. The 498 
statistically significant coefficient for this interaction is -0.08, which, when combined with the 499 
main effect for religiosity of -0.11, means that each unit increase in the religiosity scale is 500 
associated with a decline in approval of around 0.2 for U.S. citizens. This relationship is robust 501 
when we control for age, gender and education in model 5, with little change in the coefficients 502 
denoting region. 503 
 504 
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Table 3 OLS regression models predicting approval of stem-cell research (unstandardized estimates and t-values) 505 
 506 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
U.S. 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.30*** 
 (13.17) (16.19) (16.32) (15.83) (11.84) (7.86) (18.38) (18.74) (12.00) 
          
CAN 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.29*** 
 (13.16) (13.76) (13.69) (13.44) (9.89) (7.97) (17.04) (16.97) (11.52) 
          
Religiosity  -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 
  (-16.82) (-13.52) (-11.84) (-8.61) (-9.25) (-7.53) (-6.93) (-5.13) 
          
Relig x U.S.   -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.05* 0.02 -0.02 -0.04* -0.00 
   (-3.54) (-4.05) (-2.14) (0.95) (-1.06) (-2.33) (-0.16) 
          
Relig x CAN   -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
   (-1.09) (-1.37) (-0.81) (0.15) (0.07) (-1.43) (-0.83) 
          
Female    -0.06*** -0.04** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.03** 
    (-3.69) (-2.67) (-3.05) (-3.64) (-3.37) (-2.67) 
          
25-34    0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
    (0.50) (0.42) (0.37) (-0.02) (0.02) (-0.00) 
          
35-44    0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
    (1.51) (0.95) (0.85) (0.67) (0.77) (0.38) 
          
45-54    0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
    (0.64) (0.04) (0.00) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.89) 
          
55-64    -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08** 
    (-0.22) (-1.27) (-1.38) (-1.80) (-1.90) (-2.71) 
          
65+    -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
    (-0.15) (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-1.92) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
          
          
High school    0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.02 0.02 0.01 
    (3.12) (2.74) (2.92) (1.14) (0.87) (0.75) 
          
College+    0.23*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 
    (9.15) (7.72) (7.77) (4.81) (4.44) (3.63) 
          
Still studying    0.22*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.09** 0.08* 0.07 
    (5.27) (4.47) (4.52) (2.60) (2.34) (1.87) 
          
EducationDK    0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
    (0.52) (0.29) (0.31) (0.04) (-0.00) (-0.14) 
          
Moral     0.24*** 0.20***   0.13*** 
     (30.35) (22.46)   (16.29) 
          
Moral x U.S.      0.25***   0.17*** 
      (10.11)   (7.01) 
          
Moral x CAN      0.14***   0.12*** 
      (5.19)   (4.39) 
          
Benefit       0.56*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 
       (63.07) (59.06) (57.09) 
          
Ben x U.S.        -0.16*** -0.31*** 
        (-6.56) (-11.33) 
          
Ben x CAN        -0.25*** -0.35*** 
        (-8.90) (-11.43) 
R2 0.028 0.053 0.038 0.056 0.136 0.144 0.316 0.324 0.356 
t statistics in parentheses. N=10761 507 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 508 
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 509 
 510 
 511 
Looking across table 3 to model 6, we introduce our measure of moral judgment on stem-cell 512 
research. The effect is statistically significant and positive – in other words, the belief that stem-513 
cell research is morally acceptable is associated with its approval. More interesting is that when 514 
we examine the interaction between region and moral attitude, we find a significant positive effect 515 
for both Canada and the U.S. That is to say, moral attitudes, which we regard at least in part as 516 
tapping into a sanctity of life ethic, are more consequential for public approval in both North 517 
American countries compared to Europe. 518 
 519 
In models 7 to 9 we test the same idea, only in this case with beliefs about the potential benefits 520 
of stem-cell research. The coefficient for benefit (0.56) in model 7 is substantial and statistically 521 
significant. Approval of stem-cell research is strongly tied to beliefs about its potential benefits. 522 
This comes as no surprise: the more people believe that benefits will flow from stem-cell research, 523 
the more likely they are to approve of it. To see whether these beliefs are more or less important 524 
in different regions, in model 8 we ; but when we add the interaction  terms as we did for moral 525 
attitudes. We find for benefit attitudes, we find that it isthey are negative for both Canada and the 526 
U.S: . the effect of benefit beliefs on approval is smaller in North America than in Europe. That 527 
is to say that The implication is that how useful North Americans believe stem-cell research to be 528 
is perception of benefits, or the utility ethic, is less important than it is for Europeans for in 529 
determining how likely they are to approve of it. approval in North America compared to Europe. 530 
In the final model, we simultaneously fit both interactions. The results are substantively 531 
unchanged, with all the interaction terms remaining significant and of similar magnitude. 532 
Important also to note is that our final model explains more than 30 percent of the variation in 533 
approval for stem-cell research. While this leaves open the possibility that other systematic 534 
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unmeasured factors are important for a full understanding of public opinion on the issue, it does 535 
mean that the dimensions we have investigated here are of substantial importance.    536 
 537 
 538 
 539 
Robustness check 540 
In treating 25 European countries a single bloc, we of course run the risk of masking substantial 541 
heterogeneity. To check whether this was a significant problem, we re-estimated the models 542 
within each of the 25 countries separately. We found that the pattern of coefficients was very 543 
similar within each European country to the overall results treating countries as a bloc as reported 544 
above. In particular, no European country’s pattern ranking inof the size of coefficients for moral 545 
and benefit‘quality of life’ and ‘sanctity of life’ resemble those for the U.S. and Canada. We are 546 
confident, therefore, that we have identified dimensions of difference that are substantially 547 
‘transatlantic’ in nature.    548 
 549 
Discussion 550 
Despite elite voices that have been critical of stem-cell research in Europe, Canada and the U.S., 551 
the majority of the public has been supportive for the past decade. But the fault lines of 552 
contemporary bioethics are reflected in public views. Religion plays an important part in many 553 
people’s lives, especially in the U.S., yet in the case of stem-cell research it does not always result 554 
in positions of closure, pitting science against religion or religious versus secular world-views. 555 
While a small majority of the most religious want a veto on stem-cell research, many equally 556 
religious people have been willing to support it. 557 
 558 
Our findings are consistent with the premise that public views on stem-cell research are framed 559 
by at least two key dimensions – moral concerns and beliefs about benefits. Although it would be 560 
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unwise from survey data such as this to conclude that publics are weighing formal ethical 561 
positions against each other, we believe that the attitudinal positions we identify in our analyses 562 
to some degree map on to conventional ethical positions positions towards human life: namely, 563 
the sanctity of life and the  quality of life. Even taking into account standard demographic 564 
groupings, perceptions of the benefits and of the moral acceptability of stem-cell research point 565 
to differences in views that go beyond what one might expect based on, for instance, religious 566 
and educational cleavages in the population. That is to say, both the more and less religious can 567 
differ in how much these two ethical dimensions affect underpin their opinions about stem-cell 568 
research. Moreover, the relative importance of these ethical positions differs not only between 569 
individual citizens but also between the U.S., Canada and Europe. In Europe particularly, given 570 
the greater relative importance of perceived benefits of stem-cell research, public support is likely 571 
to be strongly conditional on perceived progress towards the promised cures for diseases. In the 572 
U.S., where considerations of moral acceptability assume more importance than outweigh 573 
consideration of benefits,  in the public mind, continued support for stem-cell research may be 574 
conditional to a greater extent on how embryonic stem-cells are obtained. hinge on whether the 575 
ethicalpolitical debate develops in a direction that emphasises sanctity of life over other 576 
considerations. At all events, the benefits need to be perceived as greater by Americans compared 577 
Europeansas greater in the U.S. in order to be persuasive in the face of outweigh such strong 578 
moral concerns.  579 
 580 
Finally, wWhile support for stem-cell research has grown in the U.S. during the past decade, 581 
bringing attitudes more into line with those in Canada and Europe, there are political currents that 582 
exist moving in parallel – for instance the entrenched partisan positions on abortion – that may 583 
yet lead to a reversal of the trend. find that trend reversed. Some commentators have suggested 584 
that we have entered a ‘post-truth’ era (35). At the same time, newly inaugurated President Donald 585 
Trump was elected on an anti-abortion ticket. With this in mind, If this is true, we might expect 586 
to see shared values and norms, or indeed ‘public ethics’, becoming even more relevant for 587 
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understanding how sensitive technologies enter into the public sphere and how public policy is 588 
framed in response.  On the other hand, over the same period, in the U.S., the proportion of those 589 
identifying as Christian has declined (32). If this decline continues, then support may remain 590 
steady or even increase.  At all events, in the case of sensitive technologies in the life sciences – 591 
the science of life itself – the importance of individual and collective values and public ethics can 592 
scarcely be exaggerated. 593 
 594 
 595 
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Dear editor 
 
We thank the reviewer for the very helpful and detailed comments on our paper. We are 
happy to have the opportunity to present a revised version, which is, we believe, much 
improved, having taken note of these comments.  
 
Generally speaking, we accept that the claims we appeared to be making for the 
interpretation of survey data as direct evidence of ethical reasoning were somewhat 
overstated. We try to make clear in the revised paper that we regard public opinion as 
something (for which there is good psychological evidence) that can broadly map onto 
formal ethical positions rather than express them directly. Sharpening the nature of this 
assumption has been very helpful in interpreting the results.   
 
Below (in italics) we provide a response to each point raised by Reviewer#1. 
 
 
Reviewer #1: Overall 
While the manuscript is motivated by an interesting question – what can we learn about 
differences in religiosity and attitudes toward stem cell research across nations, a decade 
hence – there are many details left unexplained and limitations left undescribed, and the 
reviewer has concerns about the interpretation and conclusions. 
 
The major issue of interpretation relates to the framing of the answers to questions about the 
moral acceptability of embryonic stem cell research and the potential medical benefits with 
'moral' and 'benefit' attitudes, respectively. And further, the equation of a belief in potential 
benefits with a ‘utilitarian ethic’ (apparently in contrast to a moral attitude). While the first 
question from the European survey used in this part of the analysis clearly relates to 
respondents’ beliefs about the moral status of the embryo, there are many other moral 
considerations to weigh, such as those related to a duty to care for the ill, or what will happen 
with the embryos if they are not used in research. There was a very good survey done by the 
Genetics and Public Policy Center, in Washington, DC, at the same time that demonstrated 
that only 6% of folks were consistently and completely for or against ESCR – for the other 
88%, there were other factors shaping their views beyond moral status. These two questions 
are also very difficult to contrast, given that the first is asking about the certain destruction of 
the embryo, whereas the second is asking about the certain production of benefits – but this is 
science and we cannot know definitively if it will pan out (the question in the North 
American survey was better designed). People might have said “no” simply because there 
was, in fact, no way to know if it was true. Finally, equating an assessment of (potential)  
benefit with a utilitarian (versus moral or ‘sanctity of life’) ethic is an inappropriate and 
unsupported leap. It is merely an assessment of benefit, that may or may not then lead to a 
moral judgement about the acceptability of the research. Thus, the 'sanctity of life' versus 
'quality of life' dichotomy cannot be addressed with these data. 
 
We thank Reviewer#1 for drawing our attention to the Genetics and Public Policy study. We 
have included a discussion of the results of this alongside coverage of other representative 
surveys from each of the included countries. The fact that attitudes in the GPP survey were 
shown to be for almost all respondents somewhat ambivalent is reassuring, and consistent 
with the premise of our analysis in that we assume that ‘approval’ is not a simple judgement 
but one that is inevitably conflicted.     
 
Response to Reviewers
 Regarding the limitations of the study, they are many and unreported. There is insufficient 
information about the different surveys [e.g., were the US and Canada surveys representative, 
were the surveys biased in any way (a problem that was rampant in surveys on ESCR at the 
time), how did the authors account for the order of magnitude difference in sample size]. 
There are variables missing that are known to be important in attitudes toward stem cell 
research (and other emerging technologies), such as knowledge of the technology, education 
level, and loved one with a disease that might benefit from the research (e.g., diabetes). 
 
We have included more information in the Data and methods’ section about the surveys in 
clarifying what is the reason for the differing sample sizes and citing technical reports and 
other papers that have employed the same datasets.  
 
We are aware that there are of course numerous correlates of attitudes to stem-cell research 
but our aim here is to adjust for important confounders, rather than exhaustively account for 
as much variance in the dependent variable as possible. Included in our set of controls is 
education level, which, as well as being important in its own right, is known to be strongly 
correlated with science knowledge. Although there it is very probable that having a loved one 
with a disease that might benefit from the research, we think that this is likely to be a fairly 
randomly distributed variable and poses little threat to interpreting the associations in which 
we are interested in the analysis. 
 
 
The conclusion that public opinion is and is likely to continue to be important is both 
unremarkable and unsupported by the data. The data are about the state of public opinion in 
2005, not the role those views had in “framing policies and regulatory regimes” or “the 
importance of individual and collective values”. 
 
We agree that this conclusion as stated is unremarkable and uninformative. We have revised 
the concluding section of the discussion to focus a little more on the ethical/attitudinal based 
nature of support and possible developments in relation to the changing nature of politics in 
the U.S.  
 
 
Specific Comments/Questions 
p.3 ¶2 “…have progressed from anathema to...” → What is the evidence that this happened? 
Some proportion of the population views new biomedical technologies as anathema, but I 
doubt this was universally the case for either contraception or IVF. 
 
We agree that this description was unwarranted. We have removed the term anathema and 
now simply point to the widespread acceptance of these technologies. 
 
¶3 “…a fleeting moment of moral consensus…” → What was the consensus? And of which 
public? 
 
We have removed reference to moral consensus but replace it with outrage, as these are the 
findings from an international content analysis of media representations of Dolly the sheep, 
reported in the linked citation (5).  
 
p.4¶2 Aren’t “elite discourse” and “debate amongst scientists, legislators, regulators and 
ethicists” the same thing? 
 
We use ‘elite discourse’ as the umbrella term, but we describe the actors who engage in it in 
the interests of clarity. We agree that the phrase could be read as redundant and have 
therefore punctuated the sentence with an additional comma so that the description of the 
actors now appears in a dependent clause.  
 
 
p.5¶3 Bush vetoed stem cell bills in July of 2006 and June of 2007 – both vetoes did not 
occur in July 2006. 
 
Corrected. 
 
p.8¶1 It would be helpful to include information about the nature and reliability the three 
surveys listed in this paragraph, so the reader has some sense of how much weight to put in 
the data reported. 
 
We have added some text clarifying the scope and design of the VCU series. Further details 
can be found in the linked citation. 
 
 
p.8¶2 “It would seem valid to assume that populations find it easier to adopt positive 
attitudes…” → It would seem valid that populations are more likely to express positive 
attitudes… You’ve no idea about the ease of adoption. 
 
We agree and have removed the text relating to ease of adoption. 
 
p.9¶2 Better to state that the questions are about what was the case in 2005, not what is the 
case now. 
 
We are not sure of exactly the recommendation is here, but we have, we believe, made it clear 
at many points elsewhere in the paper that the questions refer to what was the case in 2005.  
 
p.10- The Methods section needs more detail. Are the US and Canadian samples 
representative? Are they biased or otherwise slanted one way or the other? How are you 
accounting for the dramatic difference in sample size? What is the point of the regression 
models? What’s a dummy variable and why are you using it? How do you justify comparing 
the very different acceptability questions? 
 
We have added some text making it clear that all of the samples are based on probability 
designs and are representative of the adult populations of their respective regions. We also 
additionally cite the technical report from the US/Canada study and another article in 
‘Science’ that utilizes the datasets we use here.  
 
We have no reason to think that there is any particular bias or slant, and we are reassured by 
the fact that other surveys from around the same period give similar indications of approval 
levels. 
 
We have added some text just to make clear that the difference in sample sizes are not 
haphazard but come as a result of the initial design (the issued and target sample in Canada 
was larger than in the US.) Not all questions were asked of all respondents (according to a 
random split-half design) which accounts for the smaller Canadian analytic sample. 
 
The regression models test the hypotheses that we state and are the vehicle for answering the 
questions we have about the differential importance of moral considerations and perceived 
benefits across the study regions. We believe that we make clear the implications of the 
regression estimates in the accompanying results section and conclusion.   
 
p.14¶ln361 This description is not clear and support for such adjustment not provided. 
 
We have rewritten the description to improve its clarity and provide a rationale. 
 
p.15¶1 This whole paragraph is confusing. What and why are dummy variables? What are the 
reference categories? Is 501 the number of people who answered “don’t know”? If so, from 
which population(s)? 501/25000 is very different from 501/1200. 
 
Although ‘dummy variable’ and ‘reference category’ are part of standard statistical 
terminology, we acknowledge that it is unhelpful for a wider readership to use unnecessary 
jargon. We replace dummy variable with ‘binary variable’ and reserve introducing 
discussion of reference category until the results section (where coefficients are stated as the 
effect of being in a particular category compared to the omitted one (in our case , for age, 
this is 15-24).  
 
There was an error in the original 501 ‘don’t knows’ which we have corrected and stated 
from which sample the revised (smaller) number originates. 
  
p.16Table1 The numbers in the N row don’t match any prior data reported. The difference is 
not explained. 
 
Footnote added to the table to explain this. Also now explained in the methods section 
earlier. 
 
¶2 “Table 2 shows that in all regions, approval of SCR does indeed decline as religious 
commitment increases.” and later “religion is strongly associated with support for and 
opposition to SCR in all regions” → Is this statistically significant? The numbers for Europe 
Disapprove, for example, look relatively flat. 
 
We tested this and for each region the differences are indeed statistically significant at 
<.001. We don’t propose to mention this in the text as we are focusing on description. 
 
 
p.19-20Table3 Need further explanation of this table in legends and text. 
 
Having reviewed the latest version of text, and made some small additions to it and the 
legend we feel that the description and interpretation of results contained in the table is now 
quite extensive and conveys the implications for our hypotheses and questions as clearly as 
we can. We would welcome advice on any particular aspects of this section that need 
improving further if necessary.  
 
 
 p.21¶2 “This comes as no surprise; but when…” → This sentence, through the end of the 
paragraph, is not at all clear. 
 
We have written this up more clearly and expanded on the interpretation of interaction terms.  
 
p.23¶1 “…outweigh such strong moral concerns.” → Those of a minority, yes? 
 
Yes, and we have rewritten this sentence to make the implication clearer. We agree that 
outweigh was an unfortunate term to use in this context.  
 
¶2 “While support for SCR has grown in the US… more into line with those in Canada and 
Europe…” → But you reported in Table 1 that the US had much higher approval levels than 
Europe in 2005. How does an increase in support in the US then bring the US more in line 
with Europe? 
 
The US had lower levels of approval than Europe further back, in 2002, but we agree that 
this sentence does not convey the situation very accurately, so we have removed the 
comparison with Europe. 
 
